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GOVERNING SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If you ask most corporate law scholars about adequate representation 
in securities class actions they will suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that 
it, and other due process rights have little or no relevance.  Securities 
cases are all about deterrence, they explain.  After all, if private class 
actions supplement public enforcement and aim principally to deter 
fraud, then a private plaintiff serves merely as a placeholder, one that 
could be easily interchanged with someone else as long as either would 
pursue the lawsuit.1 
But this freewheeling, quasi-bounty hunter model is not what 
Congress intended.2  Once Congress enables private attorneys to act on 
the class‘s behalf and pursue its property interests, judges must ensure 
that class members are treated equitably and that the institutional 
arrangement is legitimate.  When class actions involve monetary 
compensation, such as securities-fraud class actions, they trigger the 
―property‖ portion of the Due Process Clause‘s protection against 
deprivation of ―life, liberty, or property without due process of law.‖3  
Due process for class actions includes adequate representation, notice, 
an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to opt out.4  The 
representative relationship is thus one of constitutional proportions.  The 
Supreme Court explained as much when it pinpointed ―adequate 
representation at all times‖ as part of absent class members‘ due process 
rights in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,5 though the doctrine‘s roots 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  This short essay expands on an 
idea that I first discussed in Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109 (2011). 
 1. The Supreme Court recently rejected a related argument in Taylor v. Sturgell, where it 
rejected the government‘s argument that nonparty preclusion more broadly in ―public law‖ litigation.  
533 U.S. 880, 902 (2008). 
 2. The SEC has, however, paid whistleblowers for information that the SEC can use in its 
public enforcement scheme.  See Diane Francis, SEC and Bounty Hunters, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 
11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-francis/sec-and-bounty-hunters_b_676696.html. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. 
 4. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 6235–26 (1996) (concerning 
adequate representation); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (concerning opt 
out); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 317 (1950) (concerning notice); 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940) (concerning adequate representation); Londoner v. City 
and Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (concerning opportunity to be heard); see generally 
Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997) 
(discussing the importance of giving class members an opportunity to be heard).  These due process 
requirements apply to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 
 5. Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 798. 
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extend back to Hansberry v. Lee.6 
This short essay, written for a symposium on The Principles and 
Politics of Aggregate Litigation: CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, decouples 
due process from a proceduralist‘s intuition and explains why it matters 
in securities class actions.  It begins by exploring several analytical 
models that shed light on the representative relationship in class actions, 
including a public law analogy to the administrative state, a private law 
analogy to corporate law, and another, more modern public law analogy 
to political governance.  After finding that the political–governance 
model best addresses both sources of inadequate representation in 
securities class actions—rifts between class members and class counsel, 
and between class members and their lead plaintiff—this Essay argues 
that incorporating qualified class members into securities class action 
governance will improve due process and legitimacy in securities 
litigation just as it does in the political sphere. 
Courts currently tend to appoint one institution to serve as lead 
plaintiff for a diverse class filled with multiple institutions and 
individual investors, which threatens due process and legitimacy 
through inadequate representation.  Because the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) calls for judges to appoint institutions 
as lead plaintiffs, this inadequate-representation problem is pervasive.  
As I have elaborated elsewhere, a divide often exists between 
institutional and individual investors such that the former, when acting 
alone, cannot adequately represent the latter.7  To briefly explain this 
divide, institutions are more likely than individuals to: 
(1) trade in derivatives, which means that the institution may not 
rigorously pursue the litigation because even though it has a large voting 
stake in the defendant corporation, it lacks the risk of economic 
exposure;8 
(2) continue to own stock in the defendant corporation, which means the 
institution may exchange corporate-governance reforms for lower 
monetary settlements, whereas former shareholders would prefer to 
maximize their compensation; 
(3) take litigation risks because less money is at risk vis-à-vis its overall 
wealth than would an individual who has lost her life savings (the so-
called ―peanuts effect‖); and 
(4) think that, because they own heavily diversified portfolios, fraud is 
just as likely to benefit them as it is to harm them over time and reason 
that it makes sense to avoid significant time investments and transaction 
 
 6. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940). 
 7. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1162 (2011); 
see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900 (2008) (reaffirming that adequate representation exists 
only where, at a minimum, ―the interests of the nonparty and her representatives are aligned‖). 
 8. Burch, supra note 7, at 1124. 
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costs in pursuing wrongdoing.
9
 
Plaintiffs‘ attorneys might lessen these concerns if they had a stronger 
economic incentive to protect the whole class, but unfortunately that‘s 
not the case.  To maintain their competitive advantage after the PSLRA, 
plaintiffs‘ law firms began courting large institutions, suggesting they 
serve as lead plaintiff, and encouraging them to select their law firm as 
lead counsel.  To perform these functions, plaintiffs‘ law firms monitor 
institutions‘ investment portfolios for ―free,‖ notify the institution when 
a significant loss occurs, and encourage the institution (usually a 
pension fund) to become a contender for lead plaintiff.  Courting 
institutional investors does not end with these preexisting contractual 
relationships for portfolio monitoring.  Rather, it may continue in more 
surreptitious ways, such as employing lobbyists to encourage the fund to 
select the lobbyist‘s employer as class counsel or engaging in pay-to-
play practices.10 
Because the lead plaintiff typically selects class counsel,11 once 
selected, counsel has every incentive to placate the institution in 
exchange for repeat business.  But the attorney has few incentives to 
represent other institutions or individual investors, and even fewer 
incentives to notice rifts between class members that would require sub-
classing and separate representation since alternative representation 
would mean having to share the attorney‘s fee award. 
The solution to this adequate-representation problem lies not in 
refusing to certify securities class actions, which would lessen their 
deterrent effect, but in further developing the political-governance 
analogy.  Once we stop viewing inadequate representation as an isolated 
 
 9. Id. at 1124, 1162. 
 10. Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A. C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play in 
Securities Class Actions, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047; Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Paying-to-Play in Securities Class 
Actions: A Look at Lawyers’ Campaign Contributions, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725 (2009).  But see David 
H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An 
Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2032 (2010) (casting doubt on the pay-to-play theory and 
finding ―no support for the theory that unions drive beneficiary board members to obtain lead plaintiff 
appointments‖).  The Cendant litigation is one of the best-known examples.  See In re Cendant Corp.: 
Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003), aff’d, 404 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005).  A search by Jim Cox 
and Randall Thomas for the sixteen law firms regularly engaged in shareholder litigation found that six 
states where three of the best-known law firms disclosed hiring lobbyists, including Milberg Weiss, 
Abbey Gardy & Squitieri, and Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshiz.  Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. 
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 133, 186–87 (2004). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2006) (―[T]he most adequate 
plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.‖); In 
re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[T]he court should generally employ a 
deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff‘s choices [of counsel].‖); In re Flight Safety Techs., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 132 (D. Conn. 2005). 
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problem and situate it within our broader knowledge about 
representative relationships in the political context, alternative solutions 
become apparent.  Just as a decision-making body like Congress 
includes members from politically diverse districts who each represent 
their constituents, so too should the decision-making body in a securities 
class action reflect class members‘ diverse viewpoints.  This solution 
requires (1) that courts appoint a truly representative lead-plaintiff group 
based on class members‘ heterogeneous interests and (2) that lead 
counsel defer to that group‘s decision-making authority. 
II. ANALOGIZING THE REPRESENTATIVE RELATIONSHIP 
Representative relationships exist in a number of contexts, each with 
unique degrees of separation, control, incentives, and constraints.  
Consider three different examples.  First, when a government agency 
like the SEC prosecutes fraudulent behavior, it represents the public‘s 
interest.  This representative relationship, however, is liberal in that 
accountability is layered: the public elects the President of the United 
States, who then appoints five commissioners from various political 
parties, who then oversee 3,500 staff and eleven regional offices.12  As a 
second example, when shareholders select a board of directors to 
oversee a company‘s activities, that board represents the corporation and 
its shareholders.  The board thus owes them duties of care and loyalty.  
This representative relationship is more exclusive than the SEC‘s 
relationship to the public; it runs to a smaller segment of the population, 
but depending on how the board is selected and retained, representation 
may lack direct accountability.  As a final example of representative 
relationships, when we go to the polls each year, we elect members to 
local, state, and federal governments to represent us at each level.  In 
some ways, this representative relationship is as attenuated as the SEC‘s 
relationship to the public in that the elected representative has duties as a 
United States citizen.  But the elected official must work principally to 
protect the interests of her constituents, which constrains and controls 
the relationship in a more direct way so long as the official seeks 
reelection. 
Scholars have analogized adequate representation in class actions to 
each of the relationships in these three examples in an effort to 
understand, improve, legitimize, and theorize the connection between 
class representatives (class counsel and the named plaintiff) and class 
members.  This Section briefly highlights and summarizes the analytical 
 
 12. How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited May 20, 2012). 
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move from vast administrative analogies, to corporate law principal–
agent concerns, to, more recently, governance in political theory.  
Though the coverage provided here is but a snapshot of each analogy, it 
highlights the historical lineage of our efforts to contextualize and 
comprehend adequate representation.  Sifting through these models also 
allows us to consider each analogy‘s limits when contrasted with 
modern practice. 
First, in their seminal 1941 article, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield provided one of the 
first administrative models for understanding the class‘s relationship to 
its representative.13  They viewed privately enforcing securities laws as 
an outcropping of or complement to the SEC.14  As such, they implicitly 
defined interests broadly and thus had an expansive notion of when a 
litigant could act on someone else‘s behalf.15  As Steve Yeazell explains 
it, the Kalven–Rosenfield view essentially weds two ideas: ―First, it 
embraces the interest definition of the class, requiring no more than an 
(assumedly) shared interest in recouping losses.  Second, it links that 
concept of the interest class not to any particular social group but to the 
general task of law enforcement.‖16 
According to the Kalven–Rosenfield view, the divide between 
institutions and individual investors is less troubling—both have a basic 
interest in recovering their losses and enforcing substantive rights.17  
The difficulty here, however, is distinguishing the interests of the class 
representative and the class from the public at large.  Without that 
distinction, the ability to prevent repetitive litigation through preclusion 
is in jeopardy and the representative‘s fiduciary obligations are too 
amorphous to enforce.  Yet, remember that in 1941, before modern Rule 
23 was adopted in 1966, plaintiffs opted into rather than out of the class 
and thus actually consented to the representation.  Thus, affirmative 
consent counterbalanced this expansive view of the representative 
relationship.18 
Second, the private, corporate law model analogizes the relationship 
 
 13. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 684, 686–88, 699 (1941). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 691–93, 699. 
 16. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 232 (1987). 
 17. Id. at 710, 717–19.  One commentator has argued that adequate representation should not be 
a concern so long as class members are not made worse off than they would have been by individually 
controlling their cases.  Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 
1151–58 (2009).  In response, I have argued that this may create problems of its own including questions 
about procedural legitimacy.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Response Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 55 (2010). 
 18. Kalven, supra note 13, at 692–94 n.33, 711. 
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between the class members and their representatives to the relationship 
between shareholders and management.19  In particular, it views the 
class members‘ relationship to their agents as a fundamental problem 
inherent in separating ownership from control.  Class members, like 
shareholders, bear the benefit and the burden of having someone else 
control both the day-to-day decisions and the litigation‘s settlement 
terms.20  When owners employ managers to control their assets, as in a 
shareholder–director relationship, the managers may lack the incentive 
to maximize owners‘ assets.  Actors within securities class actions are 
subject to the same economic pressures: the attorneys act as financiers, 
but the class members truly own the claim. 
Suppose, for instance, that a defendant offers to settle a case for 
nominal value either before a complaint is ever filed, or soon after.  The 
clients may not be inclined to accept the offer, particularly if their goals 
are to reveal cover-ups or reform corporate practices.  But the lawyer 
might see the settlement as more attractive, particularly if she is working 
on a contingency fee.  She gets roughly one-third of the settlement as a 
fee rather quickly and can then work on other cases.  Granted, more 
work could lead to a larger payout for the attorney but it involves more 
risk and only marginal increases.21  For example, assume the attorney 
thinks that working on the case for another year might produce a 
settlement offer of $300,000 more than whatever the current offer is, but 
that work would cost her $150,000.  Assuming a one-third contingent 
fee, she would receive only $100,000, but the clients' settlement value 
would still be greater.  This conflict arises because of the attorney‘s dual 
role: she is not simply acting as the client‘s agent, she is also financing 
the litigation, making her a creditor and the litigation a joint venture of 
sorts.22  Agency rules encompass the former relationship and the agency 
itself, but ignore and even eschew the other roles.23 
 
 19. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04, at 14–22 (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 
2005). 
 20. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).  Sam Issacharoff has also applied the labels exit, voice, and loyalty to the 
class context.  Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 337, 366. 
 21. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 
(1987). 
 22. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000) (observing the same phenomenon in the class action context); Charles Silver, 
Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 302 (2003) (positing 
that Coffee‘s argument applies with equal force to mass tort representations because ―[t]he plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys provide crucial financing‖).  
 23. Silver, supra note 22, at 303. 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/2
2011] GOVERNING SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 305 
Corporate governance and securities scholars have long been 
concerned about this divide between agents and their principles and the 
contexts in which that relationship unfolds, such as between boards of 
directors and shareholders or attorneys and their clients.  This problem is 
exacerbated when repeat relationships between class counsel and the 
institutional lead plaintiff tempt counsel to favor the institution over 
other class members.  To be sure, after the Supreme Court reprimanded 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor for favoring 
their own inventory of clients over future claimants with whom they had 
no direct relationship,24 attorneys have been careful not to flaunt these 
differences.  This does not mean, however, that favoritism has 
disappeared.  It could easily seep into the claims filing process, for 
example.  After settlement, attorneys might make recovery difficult for 
noninstitutional investors who keep less meticulous records and then 
have the remaining funds revert to class members who did file claims, 
likely the institutions themselves.25 
The shortcoming with the corporate law model is that it principally 
focuses on the principal–agent relationship between class counsel and 
class members.  This relationship, while vital to understanding the 
potential wedge between attorneys and their clients, tells us little about 
the relationship between lead plaintiffs and class members.  The 
adequacy and typicality requirements in Rule 23 are concerned about 
both the principal–agent problem and the relationship between class 
members and named plaintiffs.  Remedying the principal-agent problem 
does not cure the issues with unrepresentative lead plaintiffs.  For 
example, the lead plaintiff may vigorously monitor class counsel, but 
care only about her own self-interest.  When this self-interest diverges in 
significant ways from class members‘ interests, the lead plaintiff‘s 
vigilance becomes a tool for oppressing class members who have 
alternative preferences. 
The public law analogy to political governance holds the most 
promise for addressing both the principal-agent and the class member-
lead plaintiff relationship.  After all, monitoring the attorney is simply a 
more specific adequate-representation requirement: the faithful lead 
plaintiff, as an agent for the class, should not hire another agent on her 
principal‘s behalf without ensuring that the second agent—the 
attorney—performs as promised.  This governance analogy also weds 
core ideas from both the Kalven–Rosenfield administrative law analogy 
and the corporate law analogy.  As articulated by Sam Issacharoff and 
Richard Nagareda, the governance model views the relationship 
 
 24. 521 U.S. 591, 627–28 (1997). 
 25. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 288, 326–27 (2010). 
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between class members and class representatives as one between the 
representatives (the governors) and the members (the governed).26 
In his article, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, Professor Issacharoff frames the class certification inquiry as 
two distinct questions: ―the necessity of class treatment to overcome 
collective action barriers to the prosecution of perceived group harms, 
and the question of who should control the class action and under what 
terms.‖27  The first question dovetails with the administrative model and 
the second points to the principal–agent relationship.  Just as the 
government steps in to provide public goods, the class action 
incentivizes private attorneys to supplement enforcement.  Therein lies 
the historical, collective action link to the administrative law model.  
The second question narrows the diffuse representative relationship that 
Kalven and Rosenfield envisioned to the kind of class member-class 
counsel relationship that the corporate law model depicts in principal–
agent terms. 
But the political governance model is not simply a wedding of two 
preexisting ideas.  It adds a third, critical dimension: the demand for 
legitimacy in the institutional arrangement.  Just as a government‘s 
legitimacy rests on ―the ability to curb oppressive, abusive, or self-
serving behavior that may emerge from within the newly created 
governing class,‖ the class action serves in part to tax the class members 
and appoint an agent on their behalf.28  Put differently, both political 
governments and class actions must act on behalf of a group of people in 
a legitimate way.  Recognizing the need for an agent tells us little about 
whether that agent acts legitimately on behalf of those she represents.29 
Legitimacy speaks most directly to the ability to generate preclusion.  
Absent the ability to tender finality through preclusion, a class action is 
worth little economically.  But a class action‘s legitimacy also hinges on 
due process rights: class counsel sends class members notice of the 
action; by not opting out, class members consent to the relationship; and 
the representative relationship itself must be adequate.  Because a class- 
action judgment is entitled to full faith and credit only if it satisfies these 
due process requirements, preclusion hinges on the representative 
relationship‘s legitimacy.30 
The PSLRA‘s lead-plaintiff provision adds a new twist to the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 366; Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the 
Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 638 (2008) 
(parenthetical). 
 27. Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 337; see also Nagareda, supra note 26, at 638. 
 28. Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 339. 
 29. Id. at 340. 
 30. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982); accord Hansberry v. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32 (1940). 
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representative relationship that makes sense only when explored within 
the governance analogy.  Unlike many other class actions, the named 
plaintiff in securities class actions is more than just a silent partner.  
Because the lead plaintiff has experienced the largest financial loss, we 
expect it will vigilantly monitor class counsel to maximize her 
recovery.31  Indeed, this is precisely what Elliott Weiss and John 
Beckerman intended in their seminal article that formed the blueprint for 
the PSLRA.32  According to the administrative law model, the lead 
plaintiff is just another member of the public who would opt into the 
class.  And, according to the corporate law model, the lead plaintiff is 
just another principal to whom class counsel owes a duty.  But, in the 
political governance model, lead plaintiffs—like legislators—serve a 
key function as the mouthpiece for class members.  Giving voice to 
members‘ concerns, loyally representing their interests, and monitoring 
class attorneys helps legitimize the institutional arrangement.  
III. THE LEAD PLAINTIFF‘S ROLE IN GOVERNANCE AND DUE PROCESS 
At the heart of the representative relationship lies a core question: 
how can the state, through the auspices of the judiciary, incentivize and 
legitimize the actions of a private actor to act on behalf of numerous, 
often disaggregated individuals in a way that fairly binds those 
individuals?  In short, the relationship presents a question of procedural 
legitimacy.  It is the governance account more so than any other that 
recognizes the pervasiveness and importance of this question. 
What the governance model has lacked and what this Essay adds is 
the need to incorporate qualified class members into securities class 
action governance where the economics and members‘ expertise justify 
it.  After all, the idea of a representative democracy is that a legislator is 
part and parcel of the community, knowledgeable about local interests 
and problems, and concerned with the affairs of the people.33  
Consequently, legislators must reside in the districts they serve.  
According to the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, our representative 
government also requires that ―each citizen [have] an equally effective 
voice in the election of members of his state legislature,‖ a right that is 
―unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion 
 
 31. See Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2001) (―Any lingering 
uncertainty, with respect to the adequacy standard in securities fraud class actions, has been 
conclusively resolved by the PSLRA‘s requirement that securities class actions be managed by active, 
able class representatives who are informed and can demonstrate they are directing the litigation.  In this 
way, the PSLRA raises the standard adequacy threshold.‖). 
 32. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). 
 33. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tunny, 764 N.Y.S.2d 163, 864–65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
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diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the 
State. . . .‖34  When judges appoint a single institution to serve as lead 
plaintiff, that institution is unfamiliar and unconcerned with the risk 
preferences and the remedies desired by individual class members.  
Given these differences, an individual could argue that her say in these 
matters has been diluted or ignored. 
These concerns are not the only threat to the class action‘s 
institutional legitimacy; rather, there are two additional concerns.  First, 
in a democracy, the legitimizing mechanism is a fair political contest 
(without diluting or discounting votes) where a community elects 
representatives to serve its constituency.  And second, by choosing to 
live in a particular polity, community members consent to be governed 
by those laws.  But class actions have no direct equivalent in either 
sense: lead plaintiffs are self-nominated, not democratically elected, and 
class members do not consent to being included in a class in any 
meaningful way.35 
Unless a class member requests to serve as the lead plaintiff, she has 
no say in who acts as lead plaintiff or class counsel.  Phrased in 
governance terms, class representatives lack direct electoral 
accountability.  Two imperfect checks come to mind.  First, members 
have an opportunity to object during the Rule 23(e) fairness hearing.  
Class action objectors, however, typically target the attorneys‘ fees and 
occasionally contest the settlement terms.  Rarely do objectors speak to 
the representative‘s qualifications or job performance as an election 
would.  Second, like political party elections, adversarial litigation 
during the lead-plaintiff selection process may reveal information about 
why a putative lead plaintiff is unrepresentative.  But the PSLRA 
restricts discovery aimed at the lead plaintiff‘s adequacy to prevent the 
process from becoming ―an expensive and abusive sideshow.‖36  Thus, 
neither class objectors nor adversarial litigation constrains 
representatives‘ behavior or provides class members with disqualifying 
information the way an election would. 
Moreover, class members learn of their membership status by 
receiving a class notice.  They have no say in the class definition and 
only a threadbare notion of consent justifies their inclusion.37  To be 
sure, class members can opt out, as dissatisfied institutions often do in 
 
 34. 377 U.S. 533, 565, 568 (1964). 
 35. Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 
101 (2003). 
 36. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 32, at 2109; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 37. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, when class members do 
not opt out of a class, they are presumed to have consented to the representation.  472 U.S. 797, 812–14 
(1985).  Of course, because opting out requires affirmative action by the class members, the default is to 
remain in the class, which makes this notion of consent a thin construct. 
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securities class actions,38 but opting out is a realistic option only for 
institutions and the special few receiving individual legal advice.  For 
smaller, individual investors, the economics of opting out often make it 
cost prohibitive. 
What authorizes lead plaintiffs and lead counsel to act on behalf of 
the class members is neither electoral accountability nor actual consent, 
but judicial appointment.  Judges are the only gatekeepers standing 
between the self-nominated, self-interested would-be class 
representatives and the governed.  In governance terms, Rule 23(a)‘s 
adequacy and typicality requirements set forth the representative‘s 
necessary qualifications.  Absent typical claims and similar interests, the 
voice and loyalty rights that authorize the securities class action‘s 
institutional arrangement collapse.  When judges broadly define 
interests not only in certifying the class, but also in appointing the lead 
plaintiff, they miss the importance of their legitimizing role in 
incorporating qualified putative class members into class governance.  It 
is the lead plaintiff‘s truly representative character—defined by 
typicality and adequacy—that gives voice to the governed.  And because 
that lead plaintiff shares the problems, interests, and desires of the class 
members, she loyally represents them by pursuing her own interests. 
Therein lies the distinction between most class actions and securities 
class actions: the real source of legitimacy in securities class actions is 
not just faithful representation by class counsel,39 but appointing 
representative lead plaintiffs to speak on behalf of other members‘ 
unique interests.  This is, in part, the PSLRA‘s mandate: incorporate 
qualified class members into class governance to both monitor the class 
attorneys and represent the class members.  In securities class actions, 
the choice is not simply ―between the uninformed democracy of class 
members versus the often self-interested professionalism of plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys.‖40  Rather, because investors and institutions tend to be 
sophisticated, knowledgeable, and incentivized when they have suffered 
large losses, there are reasons to incorporate them into the process. 
Although plaintiffs‘ law firms continue to recruit institutions to serve 
as lead plaintiff, institutions do have the largest amount of money at 
stake, which gives them ample incentive to play a significant role.41  
 
 38. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why 
“Exit” Works Better than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 416 (2008). 
 39. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 354 (―To the extent that the Rules direct courts to focus on 
the named class parties, they provide what is at best a distraction from the real source of legitimacy in 
class actions: the incentives for faithful representation by class counsel.‖). 
 40. Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 20, at 406. 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. (In re IPO), 214 
F.R.D. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Courts designate lead plaintiffs based primarily on which plaintiff has the largest financial interest.  In 
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This is what Congress counted on in passing the PSLRA.  Because 
Congress was skeptical of plaintiffs‘ attorneys, it enacted the lead-
plaintiff provision to instill client monitors as checks on unbridled 
opportunism.  But, because class members‘ interests differ, appointing 
lead plaintiffs based on their representative characteristics will 
frequently require the judge to appoint a lead-plaintiff group.42 
Appointing a lead-plaintiff group solves the problem that Reynolds v. 
Sims paints starkly in political context: each citizen has a right to 
participate fully in state government and that right is ―unconstitutionally 
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when 
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State. . . .‖43  
Rule 23 assumes that a representative‘s self-interest overlaps with the 
interests of those she represents so that when she pursues her own 
interests, she benefits the class.  Consequently, appointing a diverse, 
representative group with both individuals and institutions ensures equal 
access to voice opportunities, adequate representation, and due process 
in securities classes just as voting rights do in the political context.44 
The appointment itself, however, does not solve the complementary 
problem of decisional control.  Deborah Rhode raised the main question: 
should named plaintiffs ―serve primarily as ‗instructed delegates,‘ 
pursuing objectives to which a majority of class members subscribe‖ or 
―track Edmund Burke‘s notion of an ‗enlightened trustee,‘ who makes 
an independent assessment of class concerns?‖45  And how much 
paternalism should a representative exercise in making decisions? 46  
Rhode concludes, ―[o]n the rare occasions where courts have confronted 
the issue, they have done little more than acknowledge the absence of 
any ‗clear principles governing the allocation of decisionmaking 
authority between the attorney and the class.‘‖47 
Part of the problem is that there is no congressional equivalent of the 
attorney-client relationship.  The closest, albeit largely imperfect, 
analogy would be the way in which newly elected congressional 
representatives rely heavily on well-trained and knowledgeable staffers, 
 
re IPO, 214 F.R.D. at 121; see also In re Crayfish Co. Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 6766IDAB, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10134, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2002). 
 42. Burch, supra note 7, at 1155–73. 
 43. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565, 568 (1964).  Appointing a lead-plaintiff group also 
raises a host of questions about how lead plaintiffs should decide these matters as well as criticisms 
about group decision-making.  I have addressed these questions and criticisms elsewhere, so I will not 
rehash them here.  Burch, supra note 7, at 1146–55, 1180–83. 
 44. For more about these diverse points of view and which require representation, see id. at 
1160–73. 
 45. Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1192–93 (1982). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1193. 
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effectively ceding them control.48  The trouble in securities class actions 
is that lead plaintiffs have little decisional control in the first place.49  
Even the unseasoned-but-representative congress member who relies 
heavily on staffers ultimately makes the final call and bears 
responsibility for those decisions.  Conversely, lead plaintiffs‘ authority 
is limited to selecting class counsel and negotiating counsel‘s attorneys‘ 
fee, all of which is still subject to court approval.50 
When representative decision-making truly counts, as it does when 
reaching a settlement agreement, lead plaintiffs‘ authority is far from 
certain.  When confronted with this issue in the BankAmerica Corp. 
Securities Litigation, the Eighth Circuit lamented the lack of statutory 
guidance and fell back on general principles of deferring to the district 
court‘s discretion to approve settlements under Rule 23.51  Reaffirming 
the district court‘s obligation to independently review the fairness of a 
class settlement, however, tells us nothing about how the lead plaintiff 
can adequately represent the class without any corresponding power.  
Just because the judge must act as an added check to prevent unfairness 
does not mean that she serves as a substitute for representation in the 
settlement process. 
Once courts begin appointing truly representative lead-plaintiff 
groups, lead counsel should likewise allocate lead plaintiffs more 
decision-making autonomy and give their input more weight.  Class 
counsel should consult and take direction from a richly representative 
lead-plaintiff group in much the same way that an attorney consults with 
her client in individual litigation.  Usually, lawyers must discuss their 
client‘s litigation objectives, keep their clients reasonably informed, 
 
 48. See Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-
That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 318, 395 (1981) (likening each member of Congress to an 
―enterprise manager‖ and concluding that ―[f]ormer staffers provide a significant body of individuals 
who ‗know the system‘ at a relatively complex level and can serve as guides and counselors to those 
who do not yet possess that competence.‖). 
 49. Given the number of responsibilities some courts ask class counsel to perform, one wonders 
what is left for the lead plaintiff to do.  See, e.g., Cortese v. Radian Group Inc., No. 07-3375, 2008 WL 
269473, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) (requiring counsel to coordinate briefing and arguing motions, 
written discovery, and witnesses examination as well as appointing a spokesperson, calling meetings of 
plaintiffs‘ counsel, conducting settlement negotiations, directing trial preparation, transmitting 
correspondence to plaintiffs, and supervising ―any other matters‖); In re Sterling Fin. Corp. Sec. Class 
Action, MDL No. 07-1879, 2007 WL 4570729, *7–8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2007) (same); In re Flight 
Safety Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 133 (D. Conn. 2005) (same); In re Catalina Mktg. Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 225 F.R.D. 684, 687–88 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (same); In re Cell Pathways, Inc., Sec. Litig. II, 
203 F.R.D. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (same). 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(2), 78u-4(3)(B)(v) (2006); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 
F.3d 173, 199–200 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Network Assocs, Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (―The lead plaintiff owes a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality representation at 
the lowest price.‖).  The court still oversees these responsibilities, however.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); In re 
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 51. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 751–52 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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ensure that clients ―have sufficient information to participate 
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation 
and the means by which they are to be pursued,‖ ―explain the general 
strategy and prospects of success,‖ and ―consult the client on tactics that 
are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others.‖52  
Clients have the right to make decisions that affect the case‘s merits, 
such as whether to waive the right to plead an affirmative defense.53  
Given the divide between class counsel‘s interests and class members‘ 
interests, lead plaintiffs should also review and make critical decisions 
about pretrial motions and discovery.54  In short, if lead plaintiffs are to 
adequately represent class members‘ interests, monitor the lawyers, and 
minimize agency costs, then, consistent with the PSLRA‘s goal of 
increasing client control, they should have authority over decisions that 
implicate their values and litigation objectives.55 
Giving a lead-plaintiff group autonomy over conducting the litigation 
does not displace counsel‘s obligation to act in the class‘s best interests 
or the judge‘s obligation to ensure that the settlement is fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.56  Even apart from ensuring fairness to class members, 
judges have an independent reason to avoid judicially enforcing an 
unfair settlement.  As Seana Shiffrin explained in a different context, a 
court‘s ―refusal to enforce need not represent an effort to supplant the 
judgment or action of the contracting parties‖ but ―may reasonably be a 
self-regarding concern not to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or 
immoral action.‖57  Put differently, just because the parties have the 
right to propose settlement agreements does not mean that the 
government should assist them in carrying them out if the terms are 
unduly harsh toward absent class members.58 
In any class action, due process is concerned with both process-based 
 
 52. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 5 (2006). 
 53. See id. at R. 1.2(a); CANON OF PROF‘L ETHICS 7-7. 
 54. Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal 
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 124 (1979). 
 55. See id. at 125; see generally Koehler v. Green, No. CV 405-367-JFN, 2006 WL 5605002, at 
*5 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2006) (noting that the plaintiff played an active role in the previous suit by 
participating ―with class counsel in discovery and the development of legal theories and strategy‖ as 
well as in ―the mediation with class counsel‖). Granted, just because lead counsel should consult the 
lead plaintiff group on certain decisions, the group can still decide to forgo discussion on tangential 
matters. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 
2003); Laskey v. Int‘l Union, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 
F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978); Koehler, 2006 WL 5605002, at *5; Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp. 2d 
114 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 57. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 205, 224 (2000). 
 58. See id.  
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defects and substantive defects.  Although the two are related—when 
one‘s viewpoint is not represented during the litigation process, it is 
more likely to result in an unfair settlement—they are distinct.59  But 
incorporating a representative lead-plaintiff group into class governance 
and giving voice to people and entities with alternative perspectives, 
heuristics, and opinions legitimizes the process itself, which in turn 
lends legitimacy to the resulting settlement.  Including dissent in the 
process also makes for a more meaningful objector since, if one of the 
lead plaintiffs remains in the minority, she will already be informed and 
can infuse the fairness proceeding with a healthy dose of adversarial 
legalism.60  Of course, asking simply whether the process was fair is not 
the end of the inquiry.  At the fairness hearing, the judge must ask the 
further question, ―Is it fair what [these parties] have agreed to?‖61  Just 
as the judicial branch serves as a check on unconstitutional behavior by 
a duly elected legislative and executive branch, it also serves as a 
control if a representative lead-plaintiff group produces unfair results. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Corporate law scholars may be right that securities class actions are 
principally about deterrence,62 but adopting process-based solutions that 
view lead plaintiffs as easily interchangeable undermines the legitimacy 
of the system that generates that deterrent effect.  For the public to view 
the class action as fair and abide by decisions made in that context, both 
the process (including the representative quality of those in charge), and 
the outcome must be fair.  After all, we could efficiently resolve 
disputes with the flip of a coin and, by chance, reach the same outcome 
that a jury would reach, but no one would contend that such an arbitrary 
 
 59. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106 (2d ed., 1998). 
 60. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001). 
 61. SANDEL, supra note 59, at 112; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 62. Compensating injured investors actually bolsters the deterrence rationale.  Jill Fisch explains 
the link between deterrence and compensation as follows: ―For shareholders and directors to use the 
disclosed information to monitor [companies], it must be incorporated into equity prices,‖ which, in 
efficient markets, ―occurs through informed secondary trading.‖ Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 345–47 (2009). As I‘ve 
observed elsewhere: Even though many investors diversify their holdings to eliminate firm-specific risk, 
informed-secondary-market traders heavily research particular corporations, use that information to 
invest, and thus limit their diversification to profit from their research. It is these investors who make 
secondary markets more efficient by relying on disclosed information, but who are likewise 
disproportionately saddled with the cost of securities fraud. Consequently, compensating these investors 
encourages them to continue to provide a public good (efficient markets), which, in turn, enhances 
company monitoring and deterrence. Thus, this explains one link between compensation and deterrence 
and suggests that focusing purely on achieving deterrence through corporate-governance reforms misses 
the complementary role that compensation might play by enforcing mandatory-disclosure obligations. 
Burch, supra note 7, at 1117. 
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procedure is legitimate or that it promotes deterrence.  Accordingly, to 
ensure adequate representation and legitimacy in securities class actions 
and address the divide between institutions and investors, the judge 
should incorporate various ―constituents‘‖ interests into class 
governance by appointing a small, representative group to serve as lead 
plaintiff. 
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